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THE  
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION  
OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
Mahmud Jamal*  
Brian Morgan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Solicitor-client privilege has been part of the common law for over 400 
years, yet it has undergone its most profound transformation in just the last two 
Supreme Court terms. In 2001, the Court declared the privilege to be a principle 
of fundamental justice protected under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,1 and in 2002 added that a client also has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in communications with a lawyer that is guaranteed under 
section 8.2 
This paper traces the constitutionalization of the privilege, from its origins in 
the law of evidence, to its status as a substantive principle and a fundamental 
civil and legal right, to its most recent elevation to a constitutionally guaranteed 
right under the Charter. We also discuss some of the important implications 
flowing from constitutionalization. These include the potentially significant 
impact of the privilege’s new status in the civil context, and whether the civil 
bar should now be poised for a “full answer and defence” exception to the 
privilege similar to that already recognized in the criminal context. We also 
consider whether other legal privileges have similarly been constitutionalized, 
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1
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11; see R. v. McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 321. 
2
  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. 
Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, 2002 SCC 61, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 1. 
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focussing on the established litigation privilege protecting a lawyer’s brief from 
disclosure in the litigation process. Finally, we assess the impact of 
constitutionalization on the law of waiver of privilege. 
II. HOW SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALIZED 
1. Solosky and Descôteaux: Laying the Groundwork 
The modern Canadian law of solicitor-client privilege dates from the 
Supreme Court’s 1979 ruling in Solosky v. The Queen,3 which considered 
whether the privilege prevented prison authorities from opening an inmate’s 
correspondence with his lawyer. Justice Dickson (as he then was) for the Court 
stated that solicitor-client privilege “has long been recognized as fundamental 
to the due administration of justice.”4 He traced the history of the privilege to 
the 16th century with its origins in the “oath and honour” of a lawyer to closely 
guard the secrets of his client, but noted that it originally operated only as an 
exemption from testimonial compulsion.5 In other words, solicitor-client 
privilege was at first just a rule of evidence, preventing a lawyer from testifying 
about communications with his or her client. 
Justice Dickson noted how the privilege was gradually extended to include 
communications exchanged during other litigation, those made in 
contemplation of litigation, and finally to any consultation for legal advice, 
whether litigious or not. He identified its rationale as being the complexity of 
the law and the need to permit a client to speak candidly with his or her lawyer 
to defend their interests, without fear that the privileged communication would 
later be disclosed without the client’s consent.6 
Justice Dickson observed that recent case law had “taken the traditional 
doctrine of privilege and placed it on a new plane.” It was “no longer regarded 
merely as a rule of evidence which acts as a shield to prevent privileged 
materials from being tendered in evidence in a court-room.” Recent decisions 
had “shifted the time at which the privilege can be asserted.” But Dickson J. 
nevertheless stopped short of recognizing the privilege as a rule of property, 
ruling that the inmate could not invoke the evidentiary privilege because the 
prison authorities did not purport to introduce his correspondence with his 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, 50 C.C.C. (2d) 495. 
4
  Id., at 833 (emphasis added). Justice Estey (at 842-43) concurred with Dickson J. but add-
ed brief concurring comments. 
5
  Id., at 834. 
6
  Id., at 834-35. 
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solicitor into evidence in any legal proceeding.7 Thus, while the rule of 
evidence was now applied more flexibly, it still required some nexus with a 
legal proceeding. 
While the inmate could not invoke the evidentiary privilege, Dickson J. 
concluded that a broader, substantive principle of privilege could be invoked. 
He described this principle as based in the nature of solicitor-client privilege as 
a “fundamental civil and legal right” and on the “right to privacy in solicitor-
client correspondence,” saying this: 
One may depart from the current concept of privilege and approach the case on the 
broader basis that (i) the right to communicate in confidence with one’s legal 
advisor is a fundamental civil and legal right, and (ii) a person confined to prison 
retains all of his civil rights, other than those expressly or impliedly taken from him 
by law. […] 
The right to privacy in solicitor-client correspondence has not been expressly taken 
away by the language of the Regulations and the Directive.8 
Justice Dickson stated that while the public interest in maintaining the safety 
and security of the institution trumped the inmate’s solicitor-client privilege, 
the interference with that privilege was to be “no greater than is essential to the 
maintenance of security and the rehabilitation of the inmate.”9 He therefore set 
out guidelines for how the prison authorities could examine the inmate’s mail 
in order to intrude on the privilege as little as possible, noting that, where 
examined mail contained nothing in breach of security, the prison authorities 
would be “under a duty at law to maintain the confidentiality of the 
communication.”10 
Less than three years after Solosky, the Court in Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski11 
confirmed that solicitor-client privilege had indeed evolved from an evidentiary 
to a substantive rule. At issue was whether the police could be lawfully 
authorized by a search warrant to search a legal aid bureau and seize the form 
                                                                                                                                                              
7
  Id., at 837-38:  
Without the evidentiary connection, which the law now requires, the appellant cannot 
invoke the privilege […] The complication in this case flows from the unique position of 
the inmate. His mail is opened and read, not with a view to its use in a proceeding, but by 
reason of the exigencies of institutional security. All of this occurs within the prison walls 
and far from a court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is difficult to see how the privilege has 
been engaged, unless one wishes totally to transform the privilege into a rule of property, 
bereft of an evidentiary basis. 
8
  Id., at 839-40 (emphasis added). 
9
  Id., at 840. 
10
  Id., at 841-42. 
11
  [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 385. 
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filled out by a legal aid applicant, for the purpose of showing that the applicant 
had lied about his financial means.12  
Justice Lamer (as he then was) for the Court affirmed Solosky’s statement 
that the right to communicate in confidence with one’s legal advisor was a 
“fundamental civil and legal right,” which he characterized as “a personal and 
extra-patrimonial right which follows a citizen throughout his dealings with 
others.”13 He noted that in Solosky, Dickson J. had applied a standard that had 
nothing to do with the privilege as a rule of evidence, since there was never any 
question of testimony before a court or tribunal. Instead he had applied a 
substantive rule without actually formulating it. Justice Lamer noted that the 
substantive rule was based on the “fundamental right of a lawyer’s client to 
have his communications kept confidential.” He formulated the substantive rule 
that Dickson J. had applied as follows: 
1.  The confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client may be 
raised in any circumstances where such communications are likely to be 
disclosed without the client’s consent. 
2.  Unless the law provides otherwise, when and to the extent that the 
legitimate exercise of a right would interfere with another person’s right to 
have his communications with his lawyer kept confidential, the resulting 
conflict should be resolved in favour of protecting the confidentiality. 
3.  When the law gives someone the authority to do something which, in the 
circumstances of the case, might interfere with that confidentiality, the 
decision to do so and the choice of means of exercising that authority 
should be determined with a view to not interfering with it except to the 
extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the 
enabling legislation. 
4.  Acts providing otherwise in situations under para. 2 and enabling 
legislation referred to in para. 3 must be interpreted restrictively.14 
Justice Lamer’s formulation remains the basic common law framework for 
assessing claims of solicitor-client privilege. In the next 20 years, there were 
nevertheless several other Supreme Court rulings touching upon the privilege, 
establishing that it may be set aside to determine the validity of a trust 
                                                                                                                                                              
12
  In the result, the Court found that these communications were not privileged as they fell 
within a recognized “criminal communications” exception to the privilege that excludes communi-
cations that are criminal in themselves or made with a view to obtaining legal advice to facilitate 
the commission of a crime (id., at 892-94). 
13
  Id., at 871. Justice Lamer stated that the substantive rule of privilege was based on “the 
need to protect the fundamental right of a lawyer’s client to have his communications kept confi-
dential” (at 888). 
14
  Id., at 875. 
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agreement after the death of the settlor;15 drawing the distinction between 
solicitor-client privilege as a class privilege and case-by-case privileges;16 and 
recognizing that the privilege could be overridden to permit an accused to make 
full answer and defence to a criminal charge.17 Important as these rulings are, 
they ultimately remain rooted in a common law paradigm, falling short of a 
constitutional basis rooted in the Charter. This is essentially where the law 
remained until 1999. 
Some inkling of the future could nevertheless have been gleaned as early as 
1992 from the first edition of Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of 
Evidence in Canada, where solicitor-client privilege was identified as being 
implicit in the right of an accused to instruct counsel under section 10(b) of the 
Charter and part of the principles of fundamental justice under section 7. As 
these authors presciently observed: 
It has been held that if the solicitor-client privilege is to be abrogated by legislation, 
it must be done in clear and unambiguous terms. However, s. 10(b) of the Charter 
may put the protection of the solicitor-client privilege which is implicit in any right 
of an accused to instruct counsel completely beyond the reach of Parliament or the 
provincial legislatures. The privilege may also be part of the guarantee against 
deprivation of liberty or security of the person except in accordance with 
fundamental justice as set out in s. 7 of the Charter and thus may be immune from 
any legislation that would have the effect of undermining it.18 
2. Smith v. Jones: A Hint of Things to Come 
In 1999 the Court took an important step towards constitutionalizing 
solicitor-client privilege in Smith v. Jones.19 At issue was whether the privilege 
                                                                                                                                                              
15
  Geffen v. Goodman Estate, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353, at 387, per Wilson J. 
16
  R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, at 286, per Lamer C.J. 
17
  R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 607, per McLachlin J. (as she then was) for the 
majority (“solicitor-client privilege may yield to the accused’s right to defend himself on a criminal 
charge”); R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 340, per Sopinka J. (“The trial judge might 
also, in certain circumstances, conclude that the recognition of an existing privilege does not 
constitute a reasonable limit on the constitutional right to make full answer and defence and thus 
require disclosure in spite of the law of privilege”); and A.(L.L.) v. B.(A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536, at 
para. 69, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. On the full answer and defence exception to solicitor-client 
privilege, see also R. v. Dunbar and Logan (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 13, at 43-45 (Ont. C.A.), per 
Martin J.A.; and David Layton, “Third Party Production, Legal-Professional Privilege and Full 
Answer and Defence” (2000) 5 Can. Crim. L.R. 277. 
18
  John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman and Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada 
(Butterworths, 1st ed. 1992), at 672 (footnotes omitted). 
19
  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455. For commentary, see Adam M. Dodek, “The Public Safety Exception 
to Solicitor-Client Privilege: Smith v. Jones” (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293; David Layton, “The 
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could be set aside in the interests of public safety, in this case, to protect the 
public from a sex offender who had pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault 
on a prostitute and had confided to a psychiatrist his plans to kill many more. 
The accused’s counsel had referred him to the psychiatrist for a forensic 
assessment, anticipating that it might assist in defending the charge or in 
sentencing submissions. The accused’s counsel had advised him that the 
consultation with the psychiatrist would be solicitor-client privileged. During 
the consultation the accused confessed to the crime and explained that he had 
intended to kill the prostitute, and that he planned to seek out similar victims in 
the future. The psychiatrist informed the accused’s counsel of his opinion that 
the accused was a dangerous individual who would, more likely than not, 
commit similar offences unless he received treatment. After the accused 
pleaded guilty, the psychiatrist called the accused’s counsel to inquire about the 
proceedings, and was advised that the sentencing judge would not be told about 
his concerns. Shortly thereafter, the psychiatrist commenced an action seeking 
permission to be released from his duties of confidentiality.20 
Justice Cory for the majority ruled that solicitor-client privilege could be set 
aside in the interests of public safety, but only where the facts raised real 
concerns that an identifiable individual or group is in imminent danger of death 
or serious bodily harm. He cautioned that disclosure should be limited to 
information necessary to protect public safety.21 
Justice Cory variously described the privilege as “fundamentally important 
to our judicial system,”22 “both integral and extremely important to the 
functioning of the legal system,”23 a “principle of fundamental importance to 
the administration of justice,”24 with “deep significance in almost every 
situation where legal advice is sought whether it be with regard to corporate 
and commercial transactions, to family relationships, to civil litigation or to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Public Safety Exception: Confusing Confidentiality, Privilege and Ethics” (2001) 6 Can. Crim. L. 
Rev. 217; and Wayne N. Renke, “Case Comment: Secrets and Lives — The Public Safety Excep-
tion to Solicitor-Client Privilege: Smith v. Jones” (1999) 37 Alta. L. Rev. 1045. 
20
  Id., at paras. 36-43. 
21
  Id., at para. 85. Justice Cory viewed Solosky as implicitly based on the public safety ex-
ception to the privilege (paras. 56-57), even though this ground was not expressly articulated by 
Dickson J. Importantly, Cory J. identified other recognized exceptions as including the right to 
make full answer and defence to a criminal charge (innocence of the accused) (paras. 52-54) and 
communications that are criminal in themselves (para. 55). He also stated that the class of possible 
exceptions to the privilege is not closed and “may be expanded in the future, for example, to protect 
national security” (para. 53). 
22
  Id., at para. 45. 
23
  Id., at para. 46. 
24
  Id., at para. 50. 
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criminal charges.”25 He also stated that “the right to privacy in a solicitor-client 
relationship is so fundamentally important that only a compelling public 
interest may justify setting aside solicitor-client privilege.”26 Despite these 
hortatory comments flirting with a constitutional basis for the privilege in both 
the principles of fundamental justice and the right to privacy, Cory J. refrained 
from expressly articulating such a basis. 
Justice Major, in dissent, was less coy. He expressly recognized the 
constitutional character of the privilege in the criminal context, saying this: 
In the criminal context principles embodied in the rules of privilege have gained 
constitutional protection by virtue of the enshrinement of the right to full answer 
and defence, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination and the 
presumption of innocence in ss. 7, 10(b), 11(c) and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms[.]27 
Importantly, Major J. added that the constitutional principles underlying the 
privilege would also inform its extension to other circumstances, such as to 
communications with third party experts retained by counsel in preparing a 
defence, and underscored the importance of categorical protection of the 
privilege. He stated as follows: 
Each of these rights support the extension of privilege to communications between 
clients and experts retained by their counsel for the purpose of preparing a defence. 
Together, they demonstrate the reasons for denying any use of solicitor-client 
communications against an accused in any legal proceeding. To deny the protection 
of solicitor-client privilege to the confidential communications of the accused to 
those intimately involved in the preparation of his defence would frustrate these 
rights. For these reasons, the communications between an accused and his counsel, 
made in furtherance of his or her defence, are accorded the highest level of 
protection and confidentiality.28 
In short, for Major J. the Constitution itself provided a principled basis for 
extending the privilege and determining its scope. 
While Major J. accepted that a public safety exception should exist, 
endorsing Cory J.’s “clear, serious and imminent” danger test for disclosure, he 
concluded that any disclosure should exclude self-incriminating evidence. He 
stated that failing to shield self-incriminating communications could have the 
chilling effect of discouraging counsel from referring clients in need of 
treatment to professionals for help. He said that “society will suffer by 
                                                                                                                                                              
25
  Id., at para. 46. 
26
  Id., at para. 74. 
27
  Id., at para. 7. Chief Justice Lamer and Binnie J. concurred with Major J. 
28
  Id., at para. 8. 
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imposing a disincentive for patients and criminally accused persons to speak 
frankly with counsel and medical experts retained on their behalf.”29 In order to 
address this concern, Major J. suggested that the scope of disclosure should be 
as narrow as possible and guided by an accused’s right to consult counsel 
without fear of assisting in his own prosecution. As he put it: 
… solicitor-client privilege is a fundamental common law right of Canadians. That 
right must be interpreted in light of the Charter which provides for the right of an 
accused to counsel. Anytime such a fundamental right is eroded the principal [sic] 
of minimal impairment must be observed.30 
Accordingly, Major J. concluded that the psychiatrist should not be allowed 
to disclose any communications from the accused relating to the circumstances 
of the offence, but would be allowed to give his opinion and diagnosis of the 
danger posed by the accused.31 
3. Campbell and Shirose: Garden-variety Common Law Waiver 
Less than a month after rendering Smith v. Jones, the Court released R. v. 
Campbell and R. v. Shirose,32 dealing with the law of waiver of privilege. The 
case involved a “reverse-sting” operation by the RCMP in which they posed as 
drug dealers and sold a large quantity of hashish to senior personnel in a drug 
trafficking organization. The purchasers were duly convicted of various drug 
offences, but before sentencing sought to stay the proceedings on the basis of 
police illegality, arguing that the “reverse-sting” was an abuse of process. The 
Crown responded that the police had acted in good faith by relying on the legal 
advice of the Department of Justice. Rather naturally, the accused then sought 
disclosure of this legal advice to test the Crown’s allegations. The Crown 
refused, invoking the RCMP’s solicitor-client privilege. The question for the 
Supreme Court was whether the RCMP had waived its privilege by putting in 
issue its state of mind, namely, its alleged good faith reliance on legal advice. 
Justice Binnie for the Court rejected the view that merely by launching their 
stay application the accused were entitled to disclosure under a “full answer 
and defence” exception to the privilege.33 He also accepted that, where a client 
seeks legal advice to facilitate the commission of a crime, the established 
                                                                                                                                                              
29
  Id., at para. 22. 
30
  Id., at para. 28. 
31
  Id., at para. 34. 
32
  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 (Campbell), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Shirose). 
33
  Id., at para. 65. Justice Binnie nevertheless left open the possibility that “in the absence of 
waiver, full answer and defence considerations may themselves operate to compel the disclosure of 
solicitor-client privilege of communications in an abuse of process proceeding” (para. 66). 
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“future crimes and fraud” exception to the privilege potentially applies to 
destroy the privilege.34 But Binnie J. did not need to resolve this issue, since he 
found that the RCMP had waived any privilege by making a live issue of the 
legal advice it had received from the Department of Justice. As a result, he 
ordered the Department’s “bottom line advice” disclosed in order to “confirm 
or otherwise the truth of what the courts were advised about the legal opinions 
provided by the Department of Justice.”35 
It is curious that while Campbell and Shirose was released so soon after 
Smith v. Jones, where the constitutionalization of the privilege was first 
discussed, the Court chose not to engage in the brewing debate about whether 
privilege was protected under the Charter. Indeed, in Campbell and Shirose 
Binnie J. described solicitor-client privilege in rather prosaic terms, stating as 
follows: 
The solicitor-client privilege is based on the functional needs of the administration 
of justice. The legal system, complicated as it is, call for professional expertise. 
Access to justice is compromised where legal advice is unavailable.36 
As we discuss further below, it is an open question whether the Court’s 
discussion of waiver in Campbell and Shirose, on a garden-variety, common 
law basis, survives the constitutionalization of the privilege, or whether a more 
exacting standard for waiver should now be employed. 
                                                                                                                                                              
34
  Id., at paras. 55-63. Interestingly, Binnie J. hinted (at para. 58) that the “future crimes” ex-
ception would also apply to a “future tort,” such that the privilege would be lost where the client 
seeks legal advice for an activity the client knows is a crime or a tort (citing “The Future Crime or 
Tort Exception to Communications Privileges” (1964) 77 Harv. L. Rev. 730, at 730-31). See also 
Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (1999), §14.58, at 737, 
who agree that “[t]here is no reason why this exception [furtherance of unlawful conduct] to the 
solicitor-client privilege should not also include those communications made with a view to perpe-
trating tortious conduct which may or may not become the subject of criminal proceedings” (em-
phasis added) (footnotes omitted). For a recent, expansive view of the “unlawful conduct” 
exception to the privilege, see Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Sessions, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2815, at para. 
16 (S.C.), per K.J. Smith J. (“‘unlawful conduct’ has a broader meaning than simply conduct that is 
prohibited by criminal law. It includes breaches of regulatory statutes, breaches of contract, and 
torts and other breaches of duty. Breaches of contract and civil duties are ‘unlawful’ because, 
although they are not prohibited by any enactment, they cause injury to the legal rights of other 
citizens and give rise to legal remedies. They are therefore contrary to law”). 
35
  Id., at paras. 73-74. 
36
  Id., at para. 49. 
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4. McClure: The Privilege as a Principle of Fundamental Justice 
Solicitor-client privilege crossed the Rubicon into constitutional territory in 
R. v. McClure,37 which formally declared it to be a principle of fundamental 
justice protected under section 7 of the Charter. 
The central question before the Court was whether the privilege should yield 
to an accused’s right to make full answer and defence to a criminal charge, and 
if so, under what circumstances. This issue arose after McClure, a librarian and 
schoolteacher, was charged with sexual offences against several former 
students. After learning of his arrest, another former student retained a lawyer 
and gave a statement to the police alleging various sexual offences by McClure, 
resulting in more charges against him. This former student then commenced a 
civil suit against both McClure and the school board. In the course of his 
criminal case, McClure sought production of the student’s civil litigation file in 
the suit against him. His stated purpose in seeking these materials was to 
determine the nature of the allegations first made by the student to his solicitor 
and to assess the extent of the student’s motive to fabricate or exaggerate the 
incidents of abuse.38 
Justice Major for the Court reiterated many of the traditional mantra 
concerning the fundamental importance of solicitor-client privilege,39 tracing its 
evolution from a rule of evidence to its status as a fundamental and substantive 
rule of law.40 He noted that the privilege “commands a unique status within the 
legal system,” one that “stretches beyond the parties and is integral to the 
workings of the legal system itself.” Justice Major stressed the privilege’s 
“distinctive status within the justice system,” stating that “[t]he solicitor-client 
relationship is part of that system, not ancillary to it.”41 Given this unique status 
as a cornerstone of the justice system, Major J. confirmed that the privilege 
must be as close to absolute as possible and may be waived only by the client.42 
The unique challenge posed by this case, Major J. noted, was how to 
reconcile the almost-absolute privilege with the accused’s Charter right to make 
                                                                                                                                                              
37
  Supra, note 1. For commentary, see David Layton, “R. v. McClure: The Privilege on the 
Pea” (2001), 40 C.R. (5th) 19. 
38
  Id., at paras. 6-8. 
39
  Variously describing it as “fundamental to the justice system in Canada” and crucial to 
“the integrity of the administration of justice” (Id., at para. 2), “integral to our system of justice” (at 
para. 4). 
40
  Id., at paras. 17-25. 
41
  Id., at para. 31, citing Lamer C.J.’s comments in Gruenke, supra, note 16, at 289, that so-
licitor-client privilege is “essential to the effective operation of the legal system” and is “inextrica-
bly linked with the justice system.” 
42
  Id., at paras. 35, 37. 
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full answer and defence. He stated the problem before the Court with beguiling 
matter-of-factness in this way: 
Solicitor-client privilege and the right to make full answer and defence are 
principles of fundamental justice. The right of an accused to full answer and 
defence is personal to him or her and engages the right to life, liberty, security of 
the person and the right of the innocent not to be convicted. Solicitor-client 
privilege while personal is also broader and is important to the administration of 
justice as a whole. It exists whether or not there is the immediacy of a trial or of a 
client seeking advice. 
The importance of both of these rights means that neither can always prevail. In 
some limited circumstances, the solicitor-client privilege may yield to allow an 
accused to make full answer and defence. What are those circumstances?43 
Justice Major’s almost casual statement of the problem contains within it a 
striking conclusion: solicitor-client privilege is now a principle of fundamental 
justice, on a par with the Charter right to make full answer and defence, and 
indeed, with all other Charter rights. Thus the privilege was constitutionalized, 
entirely without fanfare, its obviousness hardly meriting commentary. 
Having elevated the privilege into the rarefied atmosphere of constitutional 
principle, Major J. went on to adopt a two-stage “innocence at stake” test, 
allowing the privilege to be infringed “only where core issues going to the guilt 
of the accused are involved and there is a genuine risk of a wrongful 
conviction.”44 But Major J. cautioned that, before this test is even considered, 
the accused must establish that the information sought in the solicitor-client file 
is not available from any other source and he is otherwise unable to raise a 
reasonable doubt about his guilt in any other way. Once this is shown, at the 
first stage of the innocence at stake test the accused seeking production of a 
solicitor-client communication must provide some evidentiary basis upon 
which to conclude that there exists a communication that could raise a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.45 If the accused passes this first hurdle, Major 
J. explained that the trial judge must then examine the solicitor-client file to 
determine whether, in fact, there is a communication that is likely to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt.46 
                                                                                                                                                              
43
  Id., at paras. 41-42 (emphasis added). 
44
  Id., at para. 47. 
45
  Justice Major stated that, under stage 1, the trial judge must ask: “Is there some eviden-
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doubt about the guilt of the accused?” (id., at para. 52). 
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  Justice Major stated that, under stage 2, the trial judge must ask: “Is there something in the 
solicitor-client communication that is likely to raise a reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt?” 
(id., at para. 57). He cautioned that simply providing evidence that advances ancillary attacks on the 
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5. Brown: Some Refinements on McClure 
A year after McClure, the Court confirmed the status of the privilege as a 
principle of fundamental justice in R. v. Brown,47 which again considered when 
solicitor-client privilege should yield to permit an accused to make full answer 
and defence to a criminal charge. In this case, an accused charged with murder 
sought to access another individual’s alleged confession to his lawyers that he, 
rather than the accused, had committed the murder. The individual had 
allegedly told his girlfriend of his confession, and she in turn had told the 
police.  
At first instance, the accused applied for and was granted an order 
compelling disclosure of the files, documents and notes relating to the 
individual’s communications with his lawyers concerning the alleged 
confession to the murder. In the Supreme Court, Major J. for the majority ruled 
that the disclosure order was premature, as the accused had neither shown that 
the privileged information was unavailable from another source nor 
demonstrated that the information was necessary to raise a reasonable doubt. 
He also found that there were indications that any privilege had been waived 
when the individual told his girlfriend about his confession to his lawyers, and 
this issue should have been determined before any privilege was set aside.48 
Justice Major also stated that in those cases where an individual’s solicitor-
client privilege is set aside because an accused’s innocence is at stake, the 
privilege holder must be protected by the residual protection against self-
incrimination contained in section 7 of the Charter.49 
                                                                                                                                                              
Crown’s case, such as impugning the credibility of a Crown witness, or by providing evidence that 
suggests that some Crown evidence was obtained unconstitutionally, will very seldom be sufficient 
to meet this requirement. 
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  2002 SCC 32, 162 C.C.C. (3d) 257. For commentary, see David Layton, “R. v. Brown: 
Protecting Legal-Professional Privilege” (2002), 50 C.R. (5th) 37. 
48
  Id., at para. 5. Justice Major also provided guidance on the appropriate timing for bringing 
a McClure application, stating that it is preferable to delay such an application until the end of the 
Crown’s case as the Court would then be in a better position to assess the Crown’s case, and 
determine whether the accused’s innocence is in fact at stake (para. 52). He also stated that a 
McClure application is not a “one shot” affair, and may be brought at different times during the trial 
if defence counsel believes that an accused’s innocence is at stake (at para. 54). 
49
  Id., at para. 94. As Major J. explained, the privilege-holder is not an accused, and so can-
not claim the right not to testify against himself under s. 11(c) of the Charter, and may not be a 
witness able to claim the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by s. 13 of the Charter (at 
para. 90). As a result, the broader principles of fundamental justice and the residual protection 
against self-incrimination under s. 7 would potentially apply (at para. 90). 
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In the course of his ruling, Major J. confirmed the new constitutional footing 
for the privilege, stating that it is a “fundamental tenet of our legal system,”50 
and “fundamental to Canada’s justice system and will yield only in rare 
circumstances.”51 But as in McClure, he found that where the privilege and 
innocence clash, the privilege must yield as minimally as necessary to permit 
the accused to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.52 As Major J. put it in 
Brown: 
While it is impossible to place either right higher on a hierarchy […] Canadians’ 
abhorrence at the possibility of a faulty conviction tips the balance slightly in 
favour of innocence at stake over solicitor-client privilege.53 
While a balancing of rights is a commonplace in the law, what is important 
here is that this is a constitutional balance, with the privilege on one side and 
innocence (full answer and defence) on the other. 
6. Lavallee: The Privilege Protected by the Right to Privacy 
The privilege passed another important constitutional milestone in Lavallee, 
Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. 
Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, where the Court accepted that the 
privilege is protected under section 8 of the Charter as part of a client’s 
fundamental right to privacy.54 Lavallee is particularly important because it is 
the first time the privilege has been used to strike down legislation: in this case, 
section 488.1 of the Criminal Code, which set out the procedure for 
determining a claim of solicitor-client privilege over documents seized from a 
lawyer’s office under a warrant. 
In essence, section 488.1 required material seized under a search warrant 
from a lawyer’s office to be sealed at the time of the search, permitted the 
solicitor to apply within strict time limits for a determination that the material 
was privileged, and with the court’s permission permitted the Crown to 
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  Id., at para. 89. See also para. 1 (the privilege and the right to make full answer and de-
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mental importance of solicitor-client privilege to our system of justice”). 
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  Id., at para. 47.  
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  Id., at para. 81. 
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  Id., at para. 2. 
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  Supra, note 2. Justice Arbour (McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie 
JJ. concurring) delivered reasons for the majority. Justice LeBel (L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ. 
concurring) dissented in the result, though he accepted that the privilege is protected under s. 8 of 
the Charter and agreed with the majority that s. 488.1(4) was unconstitutional (para. 84). See also 
Hamish Stewart, “The Principles of Fundamental Justice and s. 488.1 of the Criminal Code” (2001) 
45 Crim. L.Q. 232. 
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examine the seized material to assist in determining whether the material was 
privileged. 
Justice Arbour  for the majority traced the historical development of the 
privilege from a rule of evidence to a substantive principle to a principle of 
fundamental justice. She noted that the privilege acquires an additional 
dimension in the criminal context, where the individual faces the state and is 
entitled to the full protection of the privilege.55 Fundamental justice provides 
that any information protected by the privilege is out of reach of the state, 
unless the client consents. As she put it: 
It is critical to emphasize here that all information protected by the solicitor-client 
is out of reach for the state. It cannot be forcibly discovered or disclosed and it is 
inadmissible in court. It is the privilege of the client and the lawyer acts as a 
gatekeeper, ethically bound to protect the privileged information that belongs to his 
or her client. Therefore, any privileged information acquired by the state without 
the consent of the privilege holder is information that the state is not entitled to as a 
rule of fundamental justice.56 
Justice Arbour also found that a client has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in privileged information in the possession of his or her lawyer, 
declaring this to be an expectation of privacy of the highest order protected 
under section 8 of the Charter. She stated as follows: 
A client has a reasonable expectation of privacy in all documents in the possession 
of his or her lawyer, which constitute information that the lawyer is ethically 
required to keep confidential, and an expectation of privacy of the highest order 
when such documents are protected by the solicitor-client privilege.57 
Thus, the privilege was now protected under both sections 7 and 8 of the 
Charter. While both provisions were invoked to challenge section 488.1, 
Arbour J. relied exclusively on section 8, reasoning that if the legislation 
resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to section 8, it would 
also violate the principles of fundamental justice under section 7.58 
While traditional section 8 analysis requires the court to balance the needs of 
law enforcement with an individual’s privacy interests,59 Arbour J. found this 
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  Id., at para. 23: “in the context of a criminal investigation, the privilege acquires an addi-
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  Id., at para. 24. 
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  Id., at para. 35. See also at para. 21. 
58
  Id., at para. 35. 
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  Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159-60, per Dickson J. (as he then was). 
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analysis to be inappropriate where solicitor-client privilege is at stake. She 
stated that “the privilege favours not only the privacy interests of the potential 
accused, but also the interests of a fair, just and efficient law enforcement 
process. In other words, the privilege, properly understood, is a positive feature 
of law enforcement, not an impediment to it.”60 Justice Arbour therefore 
adopted a modified section 8 approach imposing more stringent norms to 
protect a client’s privacy interests. Under this approach, which Arbour J. found 
was supported by the Court’s prior jurisprudence, any legislation interfering 
with solicitor-client privilege “more than is absolutely necessary” would violate 
section 8.61 
Justice Arbour found that section 488.1 more than minimally impaired the 
privilege. She found that the fatal feature of the legislation was that it allowed 
for the potential breach of the privilege without the client’s knowledge or 
consent, as a result of absence or inaction of the solicitor in asserting the 
privilege on behalf of the client following the seizure. The privilege could thus 
be breached without the client’s express and informed authorization, and 
indeed, even without the client having an opportunity to be heard.62 She stated 
that the legislation shifted onto counsel the burden of ensuring protection of the 
constitutionally guaranteed privilege, entirely failing to address directly the 
rights of the privilege holder to ensure adequate protection of his or her rights. 
Since the right of the state to access this information is, in law, conditional on 
the consent of the privilege holder, Arbour J. found that all efforts to notify that 
person (or possibly an appropriate surrogate such as the Law Society) must be 
in place in order for the legislation to conform with section 8 of the Charter.63 
Justice Arbour identified another fatal flaw in the legislation as being the 
absence of judicial discretion to prohibit the Crown’s entitlement to the seized 
material where no claim of privilege is asserted within the timelines under the 
legislation. She stated that “reasonableness dictates that courts must retain a 
discretion to decide whether materials seized in a lawyer’s office should remain 
inaccessible to the state as privileged information.”64 She also found another 
unjustifiable impairment of the privilege in the court’s discretion to permit the 
Attorney General to inspect the seized documents to assist the court assessing 
the claim of privilege. She found that any benefit from having the Attorney 
General doing so was greatly outweighed by the risk of disclosing privileged 
information to the state in the conduct of a criminal investigation.65 
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  Id. 
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  Id., at para. 39. 
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  Id., at paras. 40-42. 
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  Id., at para. 43. 
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  Id., at para. 44. 
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Having found that section 488.1 more than minimally impaired the privilege 
contrary to section 8 of the Charter, Arbour J. observed that the Crown had not 
sought to justify the infringement under section 1. In any event, she noted that 
it would be “difficult to conceive” how such an infringement could survive the 
minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test.66 In our view, this is perhaps an 
understatement. By definition, legislation that violates section 8 for failing to 
minimally impair the privilege cannot be said to minimally impair the privilege 
under section 1. Thus, it would seem that any violation of solicitor-client 
privilege under the Court’s modified section 8 framework will fail section 1 as 
well. 
With respect to remedy, Arbour J. stated that the question of seizure of 
materials from a lawyer’s office raised several procedural options that were 
best left to Parliament to consider. She therefore struck down section 488.1, 
rather than employing remedial techniques such as severance or reading in. In 
the interim, however, Arbour J. set out 10 general principles to govern law 
office searches until Parliament decides, if it sees fit, to re-enact legislation on 
this issue.  
Justice Arbour concluded by summarizing the status and role of the privilege 
to the administration of justice in these terms: 
Solicitor-client privilege is a rule of evidence, an important civil and legal right and 
a principle of fundamental justice in Canadian law. While the public has an interest 
in effective criminal investigation, it has no less an interest in maintaining the 
integrity of the solicitor-client relationship. Confidential communications to a 
lawyer represent an important exercise of the right to privacy, and they are central 
to the administration of justice in an adversarial system. Unjustified, or even 
accidental infringements of the privilege erode the public’s confidence in the 
fairness of the criminal justice system. This is why all efforts must be made to 
protect such confidences.67 
Justice LeBel dissented.68 He agreed with Arbour J.’s conclusion that the 
legislation violated section 8 for allowing the Attorney General to view the 
privileged material to assist the court in assessing a claim of privilege — and 
thus accepted that the privilege is protected under section 8 of the Charter, a 
point on which the Court was therefore unanimous. However, LeBel J. 
disagreed with the other constitutional shortcomings Arbour J. had identified. 
Most importantly, in his view the legislation had to be interpreted having regard 
to a lawyer’s ethical obligation to protect a client’s privilege, and in this light 
provided sufficient protection for the privilege. Any other conclusion, in LeBel 
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J.’s view, would result in “[a] finding of unconstitutionality based on the 
assumption that lawyers will not perform their duties with diligence and 
competence.”69 It would, he stated, “require Parliament to build safeguards into 
criminal legislation itself against negligence, inattention, slowness in action and 
sloppiness in management and organization.”70 
An important implication of the Court’s unanimous finding that solicitor-
client privilege is protected under section 8 of the Charter is that the privilege 
has finally been recognized as a rule of property. Early cases had eschewed 
describing the privilege as a rule of property in finding that the privilege was 
only a rule of evidence, and so operated only where privileged communications 
were sought to be introduced into evidence in a legal proceeding.71 But 
including the privilege as a component of informational privacy under section 8 
means that the privilege is indeed now a rule of property. In prior section 8 
cases, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that informational privacy “derives 
from the assumption that all information about a person is in a fundamental 
way his own, for him to communicate or retain […] as he sees fit.”72 Similarly, 
the privilege expresses the client’s fundamental right to privacy over his or her 
information, namely, the client’s confidential communications with his or her 
lawyer. Privileged information is therefore in a fundamental way the property 
of the client, for him or her to communicate or retain as he or she sees fit. 
7. Things to Come: Maranda — Is There Privilege Over Lawyers’ Fees? 
The Supreme Court considered yet another privilege case in May 2003, 
when it heard argument in Maranda v. Corporal Normand Leblanc, on appeal 
from the Quebec Court of Appeal.73 Maranda concerns another challenge to a 
search against a lawyer’s office under section 488.1 of the Criminal Code, 
though in this case there was no challenge to section 488.1 itself. The Court of 
Appeal’s ruling was released before the Supreme Court had rendered Lavallee. 
An important question will therefore be how Lavallee impacts on this case. 
Maranda raised three principal questions. 
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  See, e.g., R. v. Colvin, ex parte Merrick (1970), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 8, at 13 (Ont. H.C.), per 
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S.C.R. 417, at 429, per La Forest J. 
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  Leave to appeal granted May 16, 2002. The Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision is reported 
as R. v. Charron (2001), 161 C.C.C. (3d) 64. 
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First, should a warrant be quashed where the search and seizure was not 
limited to items that could solely be obtained on the premises of the law office? 
Proulx J.A. for the Court of Appeal answered this question in the negative, 
finding that while it would be preferable to restrict a search and seizure of a 
lawyer’s office to what is strictly necessary, this is not an absolute requirement. 
In this case, Proulx J.A. found there was a link between the documents that 
could only be found at the lawyer’s premises and other documents, and so the 
whole of the search was permitted.74 
Since section 488.1 of the Criminal Code is no longer of any force or effect 
as a result of Lavallee, one can expect that the seizure itself should be found to 
have been unauthorized by law. But it could also be asked whether Proulx 
J.A.’s decision measures up to the principles established by Arbour J. for a 
warrant against a lawyer’s office. In our view, it does not. In particular, Proulx 
J.A.’s ruling fails to meet the second and third principles identified by Arbour 
J., namely, the requirements that the issuing justice must be satisfied that there 
exists “no other reasonable alternative to the search,” coupled with the 
requirement that the issuing justice “must be rigorously demanding so as to 
afford maximum protection of solicitor-client confidentiality.”75 In our view, 
respect for these principles requires that the warrant be limited strictly to 
information that is unavailable elsewhere than at the lawyer’s office. 
Second, is the presence of the client’s lawyer required when executing the 
warrant, or is it sufficient to require a representative of the Bar to attend? 
Proulx J.A. found that the latter would suffice, since this would ensure that a 
claim of privilege would be asserted, resulting in the automatic sealing of the 
seized documents. He found that this procedure went well beyond what was 
provided for in section 488.1.76 Again, in our view this conclusion fails to 
measure up to the standards imposed in Lavallee. Justice Arbour stated that the 
first line of protection for the client’s privilege is the client and his or her 
lawyer. She found that only if they cannot be contacted should a Bar 
representative be permitted to oversee the sealing and seizure of the 
documents.77 
Finally, does the amount of a lawyer’s fees and disbursements constitute a 
privileged communication? This information was sought in this case because 
the accused, who was charged with drug trafficking, had reported income in the 
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  Supra, note 2, at para. 49. 
76
  Supra, note 73, at paras. 37-42. 
77
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(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) The Constitutionalization of 231 
 Solicitor-Client Privilege 
 
tens of thousands of dollars, yet had assets in the millions of dollars. It was 
hoped this evidence would show that the accused was in possession of the 
proceeds of crime. Justice Proulx  ruled that a lawyer’s fees and disbursements 
are not per se privileged. He said that much depends on the context. Justice 
Proulx found that the fact of payment is not inherently a client communication, 
though the narrative portion of the bill of account could well be privileged, as it 
could disclose the nature and substance of the privileged communication.78 In 
our view, this conclusion is clearly correct. In the civil context, bills of account 
are routinely disclosed to the court in seeking costs. While the narrative portion 
of the account is often excised or edited in order to protect privilege, the 
quantum of payment itself would rarely be considered to be a privileged 
communication. There are nevertheless circumstances where even the fact of 
retainer, and thus the bill of account itself, could be privileged, such as where a 
client retains a lawyer on a confidential basis.79 In our view, therefore, Proulx 
J.A.’s rejection of a per se rule in favour of a contextual approach is consistent 
with the Court’s ruling in Lavallee.80 
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
Lately the status of solicitor-client privilege as a constitutional principle 
protected under the Charter has been much discussed in assessing the 
constraints this imposes on state action. This issue has arisen in the 
constitutional challenges to the federal government’s recent money-laundering 
legislation, which tried to impose reporting obligations on lawyers when 
confronted with suspicious financial transactions by their clients,81 as well as in 
the Law Society of Upper Canada’s proposed new rule of professional conduct 
dealing with a lawyer’s obligations when confronted with property relevant to a 
crime or offence.82 These are important and difficult issues, but they are not our 
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focus. Instead, we consider some less-discussed implications from the Supreme 
Court’s recent rulings, focussing on: (a) whether the privilege’s new status as a 
constitutional principle will have any impact on the civil bar; (b) whether there 
is any scope for a full answer and defence exception to the privilege in the civil 
context; (c) whether the constitutionalization of solicitor-client privilege is 
likely to extend to litigation privilege; and (d) whether the rules of waiver of 
privilege will need to be reconsidered having regard to the ordinarily high 
threshold for waiver of a constitutional right. 
1. The Constitutional Principles in the Civil Context 
Each of the recent cases considering solicitor-client privilege as a 
constitutional principle has arisen in the criminal context. The question 
naturally arises whether this status will have any significant implications for the 
civil bar. The exceptional public safety and innocence at stake grounds for 
setting aside privilege have little immediate relevance, one might think, to the 
more pedestrian circumstances in which the privilege arises in the civil 
context.83 
But a narrow reading of the recent cases as limited to the criminal context 
would in our view be mistaken. To begin with, while both McClure and Brown 
were criminal cases, in neither case was production of privileged information 
sought by the state. In both cases it was sought by a private party against 
another private party. Most tellingly, in McClure the privilege-holder whose 
privilege was weighed against McClure’s right to make full answer and defence 
was not an accused in a criminal case, but was rather a civil litigant who 
claimed damages against McClure and the school board for sexually assaulting 
him, and what was sought was production of his civil litigation file. The 
Supreme Court held that the privilege over the civil file was protected by the 
principles of fundamental justice. As a result, it is clear that the constitutionally 
protected privilege can relate to communications in a civil suit. Similarly, in 
Brown the privilege-holder who had allegedly confessed to the crime to his 
lawyers and to his girlfriend was not the accused, and production was sought 
not by the state but by the accused, a private party. Lastly, in Lavallee Arbour J. 
justified the constitutional character of the privilege as based on its “central role 
to the administration of justice in an adversarial system.”84 Given that the 
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privilege has a correspondingly central role in the civil process which similarly 
forms part of the adversarial system, one would expect the same rationale to 
extend to the status of the privilege in the civil context. 
In short, privileged communications are protected by the principles of 
fundamental justice under the Charter (or the values therein) even if they are 
made in a civil suit, and even if sought by a private party rather than the state. 
These conclusions raise further questions concerning the source of the state 
action required to engage the Charter, and whether they involve departure from 
the established rules that the Charter does not apply directly either to the 
common law85 or to court orders.86 In our view, no state action is required: a 
constitutionalized privilege principle in the civil context can be rationalized 
under the Supreme Court’s well-established doctrine that the common law must 
be developed in accordance with Charter values.87 As Professor Hogg has 
noted:  
… the exclusion of the common law from Charter review is not particularly 
significant. When the Charter does not apply directly, it will apply indirectly, and, 
despite some differences in the way s. 1 justification is assessed, the indirect 
application is much the same as in its effect as the direct application.88  
Indeed, Major J.’s dissenting reasons in Smith v. Jones had expressly 
invoked Charter values in finding that any infringement of the privilege in the 
name of public safety would have to respect the privilege holder’s right to 
counsel and the principle of minimal impairment.89 
Thus, the constitutional character of the privilege must be considered even in 
civil litigation. The privilege is a principle of fundamental justice and part of 
the fundamental right to privacy. Where the state seeks disclosure of privileged 
communications, the Charter applies directly to protect against disclosure. 
Where disclosure is sought by a private party, the privilege applies at common 
law, appropriately fortified by Charter values under sections 7 and 8. 
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2. A “Full Answer and Defence” Exception to the Privilege in the Civil 
Context 
As an exclusionary rule of evidence, solicitor-client privilege excludes from 
the court’s consideration privileged information even though it may be highly 
relevant, probative and trustworthy. This exclusion is justified by the overriding 
societal interest in protecting the confidential relationship between solicitor and 
client.90 McClure established an exception to this, permitting truth-finding 
(avoiding a wrongful conviction) to trump the privilege where an accused’s 
innocence is at stake. Since innocence cannot be at stake in the civil context, 
one wonders whether truth-finding in civil cases can ever trump the privilege.  
In our view, there is a reasonable basis to believe that it can: a McClure-like 
exception may exist even in the civil context. Support for this view comes, 
most recently, from the Court’s 2002 ruling in Sierra Club of Canada v. 
Canada (Minister of Finance),91 which held that the right to make full answer 
and defence operates as a constitutional value in the civil context in the form of 
a civil litigant’s right to present its case and its right to a fair trial. 
Sierra Club brought into question the circumstances in which a court should 
grant a confidentiality order in the civil context, in this case, to protect 
confidential documents of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited relating to an 
ongoing environmental assessment by Chinese authorities of the sites for two 
CANDU nuclear reactors purchased by China. AECL sought to rely on the 
documents to defend against allegations that the federal government had 
breached the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act92 by providing financial 
assistance to China for the sale of the reactors without undergoing an 
environmental assessment. The Court found that a restricted confidentiality 
order permitting only the court, the parties and their counsel to see the 
confidential documents struck the right balance between the constitutional 
principle of open courts and AECL’s need to protect its commercial interests. 
In balancing the rights and interests of the parties, Iacobucci J. for the Court 
considered AECL’s commercial interests, but also gave great weight to its right 
to make “full answer and defence” to the allegations in the case, which he 
equated to its right “to present its case” and to its “right to a fair trial.” He 
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stated that while this is not a Charter right, it is nevertheless a “fundamental 
principle of justice.” As Iacobucci J. put it: 
As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the 
information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences 
available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the 
appellant’s capacity to make full answer and defence, or, expressed more 
generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, 
preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis 
infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this 
does not engage a Charter right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as 
a fundamental principle of justice: M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 
84, per L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair 
trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest 
in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in 
the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the 
judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in 
having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.93 
Thus, in the civil context, full answer and defence operates as a fundamental 
principle of justice, guaranteeing a civil litigant’s right to present its case and 
its right to a fair trial. This is exactly the same as the constitutional principle 
that the Court in McClure said could trump solicitor-client privilege in some 
(albeit rare) cases. In principle, one would therefore expect a similar McClure-
like rule to operate in the civil context. The circumstances where privilege 
would yield might well be even rarer in the civil context, where liberty is not in 
issue. But if McClure is founded on the subordination of the privilege to truth-
finding in some cases, then surely the same subordination should hold true in 
the civil context in “some cases.” 
Further support for this view can be found in M. (A.) v. Ryan,94 which 
involved disclosure of therapeutic counselling records in a civil suit brought by 
a patient against her former psychiatrist who had sexually assaulted her. While 
in Sierra Club Iacobucci J. had cited from L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissenting 
reasons in Ryan, the majority reasons of McLachlin J. (as she then was) support 
the view that the right to make full answer and defence may trump a privilege 
in a civil case, though she cautioned that the disclosure threshold may be higher 
in a civil than in a criminal case. McLachlin J. said this: 
Just as justice requires that the accused in a criminal case be permitted to answer 
the Crown’s case, so justice requires that a defendant in a civil suit be permitted to 
answer the plaintiff’s case. In deciding whether he or she is entitled to production 
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of confidential documents, this requirement must be balanced against the privacy 
interest of the complainant. This said, the interest in disclosure of a defendant in a 
civil suit may be less compelling than the parallel interest of an accused charged 
with a crime. The defendant in a civil suit stands to lose money and repute; the 
accused in a criminal proceeding stands to lose his or her very liberty. As a 
consequence, the balance between the interest in disclosure and the complainant’s 
interest in privacy may be struck at a different level in the civil and criminal case; 
documents produced in a criminal case may not always be producible in a civil 
case, where the privacy interest of the complainant may more easily outweigh the 
defendant’s interest in production.95 
The above framework for a full answer and defence exception to the 
privilege in the civil context moved from the theoretical to the practical in the 
Federal Court, Trial Division’s recent decision in Baltruweit v. Canada 
(Attorney General).96 In that case, Gibson J. relied on the full answer and 
defence exception developed in the criminal context to require the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission to disclose to a complainant the substance of a 
legal opinion it had relied on in refusing to refer a complaint of discrimination 
to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. The Court noted that “while what is at 
issue here is not full answer and defence to a criminal charge, it is not without 
parallel features: it is the opportunity for the applicant to make full answer in a 
context where his allegation of infringement of his fundamental human rights 
might be […] irrevocably determined against him.”97 
Thus, it seems clear that some form of full answer and defence exception to 
the privilege will apply in the civil context. The scope of this exception remains 
to be determined by future cases. The challenge will be to keep it tightly 
constrained, as disclosure of relevant evidence can often be justified by the 
need to make full answer and defence or the right of a litigant to present its 
case. A broadly applied exception risks emasculating the privilege and 
undermining its constitutional status, rendering its constitutionalization a 
pyrrhic victory indeed. 
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3. Application to Litigation (Work Product) Privilege 
Another important issue that is likely to land in the courts before long is 
whether the constitutionalization of the privilege extends from solicitor-client 
(or legal advice) privilege to litigation privilege, that is, the privilege over 
materials and information created with the dominant purpose of preparing for 
litigation. 
While the fundamental differences between the solicitor-client and litigation 
privilege have received appellate scrutiny of late,98 one of the clearest 
explanations of these differences remains Sharpe J.A.’s article “Claiming 
Privilege in the Discovery Process,” written prior to his judicial appointment, 
where he explained as follows: 
It is crucially important to distinguish litigation privilege from solicitor-client 
privilege. There are, I suggest, at least three important differences between the two. 
First, solicitor-client privilege applies only to confidential communications between 
the client and his solicitor. Litigation privilege, on the other hand, applies to 
communications of a non-confidential nature between the solicitor and third parties 
and even includes material of a non-communicative nature. Secondly, solicitor-
client privilege exists any time a client seeks legal advice from his solicitor whether 
or not litigation is involved. Litigation privilege, on the other hand, applies only in 
the context of litigation itself. Thirdly, and most important, the rationale for 
solicitor-client privilege is very different from that which underlies litigation 
privilege. This difference merits close attention. The interest which underlies the 
protection accorded communications between a client and a solicitor from 
disclosure is the interest of all citizens to have full and ready access to legal advice. 
If an individual cannot confide in a solicitor knowing that what is said will not be 
revealed, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for that individual to obtain proper 
candid legal advice. 
Litigation privilege, on the other hand, is geared directly to the process of litigation. 
Its purpose is not explained adequately by the protection afforded lawyer-client 
communications deemed necessary to allow clients to obtain legal advice, the 
interest protected by solicitor-client privilege. Its purpose is more particularly 
related to the needs of the adversarial trial process. Litigation privilege is based 
upon the need for a protected area to facilitate investigation and preparation of a 
case for trial by the adversarial advocate. In other words, litigation privilege aims to 
facilitate a process (namely, the adversary process), while solicitor-client privilege 
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aims to protect a relationship (namely, the confidential relationship between a 
lawyer and a client).99 
Particularly significant for present purposes is the role of confidentiality in 
solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege: confidentiality of the 
communication is essential for the former but not for the latter.100 This raises 
the issue of whether litigation privilege can be justified under or embodied in 
the principles of section 8 of the Charter, as protected by the client’s 
constitutional right to privacy. In our view, litigation privilege is also protected 
by section 8 or the values therein, but the justification is slightly different. The 
privacy right engaged is not the right to privacy over a confidential 
communication between lawyer and client, but rather the right to privacy over 
the lawyer’s brief or work-product, the need for a zone of privacy for the 
lawyer’s trial preparation as a fundamental part of the adversary process.101 
This is still the client’s privacy right, exercised by the client’s agent — the 
advocate — and like the solicitor-client privilege can be waived only by the 
client. But its purpose is to facilitate the litigation process rather than to protect 
the client’s confidential relationship with his or her lawyer. 
The role of litigation privilege as a cornerstone of the adversary process also 
provides its justification as a principle of fundamental justice. The lawyer’s 
protected zone of privacy is essential for trial preparation and a basic tenet of 
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the adversary process. It therefore qualifies as a principle of fundamental 
justice under section 7 of the Charter.102 
Support for this view can be found in Major J.’s dissenting reasons in Smith 
v. Jones. Justice Major articulated the constitutional principles underlying 
solicitor-client privilege and then suggested that these principles “support the 
extension of privilege to communications between clients and experts retained 
by their counsel for the purpose of preparing a defence.”103 Justice Major later 
confirmed that the privilege should be extended to communications for the 
purpose of trial preparation, seemingly bringing litigation privilege within the 
scope of the constitutional principle he had articulated. He stated as follows: 
To deny the protection of solicitor-client privilege to the confidential 
communications of the accused to those intimately involved in the preparation of 
his defence would frustrate these rights. For these reasons, the communications 
between an accused and his counsel, made in furtherance of his or her defence, are 
accorded the highest level of confidentiality.104 
While these comments do refer to the confidentiality of communications 
between lawyer and client, the repeated references to defence preparation 
suggest that Major J. viewed this feature as equally important, such that 
litigation privilege is also constitutionally protected or at least informed by 
these constitutional values. Indeed, at least one appellate judge has accepted 
this reading of Major J.’s reasons.105 
Thus, in our view it will not be long before the reasons underlying the 
constitutionalization of solicitor-client privilege under sections 7 and 8 of the 
Charter are extended to constitutionalize litigation privilege as well. 
4. Constitutionalization of Waiver of Privilege 
Just as the law of solicitor-client privilege has been constitutionalized, so 
too, in our view, has the law of waiver of privilege. If, as is clear, the privilege 
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has become a constitutional right (or Charter value), then questions of waiver of 
privilege are now questions about waiver of constitutional rights. As such, the 
law of waiver of privilege is informed by the Court’s jurisprudence on the very 
high threshold required for waiver of constitutionally guaranteed Charter rights. 
(a) The Standard for Waiver of a Charter Right 
The Court will find a Charter right is waived only if the waiver is “clear and 
unequivocal,” and made with full knowledge of the rights waived and the effect 
that waiver will have on those rights.106 Professor Don Stuart has noted that 
“[w]hen the Supreme Court has characterized the issue as one of waiver, it has 
repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to find that there has been a waiver of a 
Charter right.”107 Thus, one would similarly expect the Court to strain to avoid a 
finding of waiver when what is at issue is waiver of the fundamental right to 
solicitor-client privilege. 
Currently, questions of waiver of privilege are not consistently approached 
on this basis. However, it can be expected that the constitutionalization of the 
privilege will have the effect of making it that much harder to establish waiver 
in particular cases. In both civil and criminal cases, disputes over waiver of 
privilege often involve inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials or waiver 
by implication (i.e., by conduct). Historically the law in this area has been 
murky and has long presented a trap for the unwary. The constitutionalization 
of privilege offers the hope of greater clarity in this area of the law, through a 
re-examination of the traditional doctrines in light of constitutional principles. 
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure 
The traditional position at common law used to be that accidental disclosure 
resulted in a permanent destruction of the privilege.108 This position was 
gradually repudiated by Canadian courts, which accepted that inadvertent 
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disclosure would not waive privilege.109 But some courts have held that even 
where privileged information is inadvertently disclosed, such that 
confidentiality is lost, it may be possible to introduce that information into 
evidence if what is being sought to be proved from the information is important 
to the outcome of the case and there is no reasonable alternative form of 
evidence that can serve that purpose.110 
A constitutionalized waiver doctrine would clearly reject inadvertent 
disclosure as sufficing to destroy the privilege. Inadvertent disclosure would 
not overcome the “clear and unequivocal” standard established by the Supreme 
Court in other contexts. Indeed, Arbour J.’s observation in Lavallee that even 
“accidental” infringements of the privilege would “erode the public’s 
confidence in the administration of justice”111 should signal that accidental 
waiver will effectively cease to exist under Canadian law. 
But the further question of whether accidentally disclosed privileged 
information can ever be introduced in court, if important to the outcome of the 
case and there is no reasonable alternative form of evidence that can serve the 
same purpose, remains very much alive. This exception would apply both in the 
criminal and the civil contexts. In criminal cases, the operative test would be 
the highly demanding McClure “innocence at stake” approach. In the civil 
context, if there is indeed a full answer and defence exception to the privilege, 
then the standard for introducing this evidence would similarly be modified to 
take account of the privilege’s constitutional character, to insist that the 
privileged information is “essential” to make full answer and defence, such as 
by preserving the right to a fair trial. This is a higher standard than one of mere 
“importance” to the outcome of the case. The infringement of the privilege 
should also meet the minimal impairment test, such that the privileged 
information is unavailable from any other source. This is similarly a standard 
higher than one that insists only on no “reasonable” alternatives. 
(c) Waiver by Implication 
Similar considerations would apply to the doctrine of waiver of privilege by 
implication. Waiver by implication occurs where, in the absence of an express 
intention to waive the privilege, a party is taken to have done so by its conduct, 
such as where that party has taken positions which would make it inconsistent 
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to maintain the privilege.112 The test used to rationalize the implied waiver 
cases has typically been “fairness,”113 in that it is viewed as being “unfair” to 
permit one party to take certain positions and then to invoke privilege when the 
other party seeks information in order to respond. 
Campbell and Shirose, discussed above, is a recent example of waiver by 
implication. There it will be recalled that the Court held that the RCMP had put 
in issue the Attorney General’s legal advice by alleging good faith reliance on 
that advice in defence to an abuse of process motion claiming police illegality. 
Justice Binnie found that the RCMP had put in issue its state of mind, and so 
the defence was entitled to get to the bottom of the legal advice the RCMP had 
received. 
It will be recalled that Binnie J. did not rely upon constitutional 
considerations in discussing either the privilege or the circumstances in which it 
is waived. It is in this sense that it was referred to as a “garden-variety” waiver 
case. But it is open to question whether Binnie J.’s approach would meet the 
more exacting standards of a constitutionalized waiver doctrine. Could it be 
said that the RCMP had “clearly and unequivocally” waived its privilege, and 
done so with full knowledge of the rights it waived and the effect that waiver 
would have on those rights? Surely at most the Court held that disclosure of the 
Department of Justice’s opinion should be ordered because the RCMP had 
impliedly waived privilege by putting in issue its state of mind. The Court did 
not go so far as to make any findings as to the RCMP’s actual knowledge of its 
rights, or as to its actual knowledge of the effect of waiver on those rights. 
Put another way, implied waiver provides a constructive knowledge standard 
for waiver. Waiver is deemed or implied as a matter of fairness given positions 
taken by the privilege holder. By contrast, constitutional waiver insists upon a 
subjective knowledge standard for waiver. Waiver is found only if the privilege 
holder is shown to have clearly and unequivocally waived its rights, with full 
knowledge of the rights waived and the consequences that this would have on 
those rights.  
Given the differences in these standards, the common law of implied waiver 
of solicitor-client privilege will probably have to be re-examined and brought in 
line with the requirements of the Charter. In sum, the constitutional character of 
the privilege will likely raise the bar on when it can be taken as having been 
waived. Waiver should be found in only the clearest cases, where a party can be 
shown to have been aware of its rights and have had full knowledge of the 
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consequences of waiving them. In our view, the vaguer “fairness” test will 
likely not provide a sufficiently precise constitutional standard. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent constitutionalization of solicitor-client privilege 
marks a watershed in the privilege’s long history. The Court’s rulings are 
obviously vastly important in themselves, but they are just as or more important 
for what they portend. Every lawyer confronted with questions of privilege — 
and every lawyer is — must now have a firm grip on the law of the Charter. 
Anything less risks compromising the now even more fundamental relationship 
between lawyer and client. 
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